The discipline of international relations is, like all other social sciences, riddled with contests between committed academics. Passionate debates ensue where theoretical realists and theoretical liberals argue over the hope for cooperation in the international system, the former arguing that any cooperation will be time and commitment limited and the latter arguing that, with understanding and rules, cooperation is likely.
Introduction
The discipline of international relations is, like all other social sciences, riddled with contests between committed academics. Passionate debates ensue where theoretical realists and theoretical liberals argue over the hope for cooperation in the international system, the former arguing that any cooperation will be time and commitment limited and the latter arguing that, with understanding and rules, cooperation is likely.
2 Consider also the reasons for conflict in international relations: some argue it is simply a manifestation of human nature, others that irrational leaders are too quick to act, other still that the constraints of the system result in a system that will always be subject to conflict and war regardless of the individual actors intents. 3 Debates rage too between those who see changes in international polarity as explicitly dangerous and those who see little difference between a multipolar, bipolar or unipolar world with regards to the incidence and extent of conflict. 4 Further still, arguments proceed between those who see a state's military as the best expression of power and those who consider economic power much more important, those who see a rising China as good for the US and those who see it is as bad, and those who see the UN as the culmination of humanity's moral advance and those who consider the Agreement on the anarchic nature of the system exists across most of the major theories of international relations. Realism, for example -being the theoretical approach that remains the primary or alternative theory in virtually every book and article addressing general theories of world politics -has maintained the centrality of anarchy to its assessment of the international realm since its precepts were first outlined. 10 Anarchy, for realists, is the defining feature of international politics and the implications of anarchy for actors within the international sphere are what drive both peaceful and non-peaceful interactions.
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Theoretical liberals also agree that anarchy forms a central tenet of international interaction, though they derive significantly different implications from the reality of an anarchic system. 12 As Alexander Wendt notes, there is wide agreement between these two paradigms on the nature of anarchy; indeed, both realists and liberals (who comprise the majority of international relations scholars) share an agreed understanding of anarchy, resulting in its acceptance throughout the discipline as the basis for all international interaction.
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Even the so-called constructivists do not deny the existence of anarchy, only its implications and its construction. As Wendt himself claims:
I argue that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure. There is no "logic" of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. 14 For Wendt and other constructivists, anarchy remains existential but the implications are constructed by the actors, not present in some sort of 'anarchic logic' as others have claimed. 15 Constructivists submit that the implications and 10 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999 It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that this assumption of anarchy limits the analysis of international affairs by international relations scholars. This paper will argue, first, that the international system is not clearly anarchic. Instead, it will be suggested that the system is complexly interdependent, sensitive to initial conditions and particularly sensitive to small both at and below the international level. It will be argued that the system is, indeed, not anarchic but chaotic.
Secondly, it will be argued that this alternate conception of the international political system has some major implications for the explanation of significant international events. Drawing on this premise, this paper will then offer a case study of the reasons for World War One as an example of the differing explanations that result when one begins from the premise that the system that is anarchic and, alternatively, when one begins from the premise that the international system is, in fact, chaotic. The readily apparent differences between conventional anarchic analysis and the suggested complex, time-sensitive analysis will, it will be argued, allow for better explanations of international interactions and conflict and, if applied in the analysis of other international events, may well prove to provide superior explanation for what occurs at the international level.
Anarchy: Evident or Illusory
Brian Schmidt argues that it is anarchy that has given international relations its "distinct discursive identity" and, noting the arguments already put in the introduction, there can be little doubt that he is correct in this conclusion. The term 'anarchy', in popular discourse, implies some sort of chaos. Thus,
The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus defines anarchy as "disorder, especially political or social". 20 While it is true that an anarchic international system can be disorderly, it is not necessarily disorderly. Indeed, it is more common for international relations scholars to discuss international order than to discuss international disorder under anarchy. 21 Within the discourse of international relations, anarchy does not imply a lack or order but a lack of overarching authority; that is, the interactions of international actors are not constrained by a more powerful force. 22 Unlike, for example, interactions within a nation-state that may be constrained by the threat of police sanctions or by legal and moral norms, interactions at the international level are essentially unconstrained. 23 Thus anarchy in international relations refers more to the orientation of the system, the nature of the system and the background to the interactions that take place.
At first impression it seems that the international system is indeed anarchical. While there are certainly and have always been powerful and less powerful states, this by itself does not imply a situation that is any less anarchical.
To be clear, the lack of equality in the distribution of capabilities is a factor at the actor level not at the system level; a system where capabilities are distributed unequally might be hierarchical but it might just as well be anarchical. 24 As well, while there are changes in polarity over time, these changes are again at the actor level and not the system level. Thus, the rise of a unipolar power, with relative power far in excess of every other international actor in almost every field of human endeavour, does not make an anarchic system less anarchic. Indeed, as
Waltz makes clear, the international system will only change from being anarchic if and when change of the system occurs and not simply change within the system.
In his own words:
[w]ithin-system changes take place all the time, some important, some not. Big changes in the means of transportation, communication, and war fighting, for example, strongly affect how states and other agents interact. Such changes occur at the unit level. In modern history, or perhaps all of history, the introduction of nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes. Yet in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possible for others' security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system. 25 Essentially, Waltz argues, the anarchic international system of today is the same anarchic international system that greeted Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Carr and Morgenthau -the significant changes at the unit level (the level of states and international actors), including the development of nuclear weapons, has not been enough to displace anarchy from its system-defining place in the international political system.
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But is the lack of an overarching authority enough to label the system anarchic? There are other systems where no single unit is strong enough to control all others. Consider the meteorological system, which is generally talked about in terms of weather or climate. Here is a system that is composed of 'actors' (or variables) such as pressure, temperature, humidity, cloud cover and sunlight, among many others, none of which has the 'ability' to control all the others. None 24 On this point see Kenneth N. Waltz. 1979 . Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley: Lake. 1996 . 25 Waltz. 2000. p.5. 26 The five scholars mentioned, along with Waltz himself, are generally considered among the most influential of the realist scholars in international political theory. Ariel Colonomos uses the evocative term "cold monsters" to describe states and actors within the amoral, realist world of international relations espoused by these five theorists. See Ariel Colonomos. 1998 A chaotic system, in the meteorological context, can be defined as a dynamical system that has a sensitive dependence on its initial conditions. The classic metaphor that demonstrates this sensitive dependence is the so-called 'butterfly effect'. As explained by Thiétart and Forgues, the butterfly effect is where "the flap of a butterfly's wing which creates, a few months after, a storm"
somewhere else on the planet. 29 As the pair explains, small variations -even seemingly insignificant ones such as a butterfly flapping its wings -might have monumental effects on the wider system. 30 As such, a chaotic system is complexly interdependent, with every small permutation or 'wrinkle' in the system having the potential to disturb the remainder of the system. Such systems may have no single controlling element but they are not anarchic; indeed chaotic systems are infinitely more complex than anarchic systems, such as the one claimed by international relations scholars to exist in the shape of the international political structure.
Is it possible that the international political system is chaotic instead of anarchic? Does a chaotic metaphor better fit the international reality than an anarchic one? If so, it would require a different theoretical understanding of the international relations between states and actors as anarchy, which allows for individual agents to make choices without automatic sanction, would be replaced by a system where the impacts of every decision have the potential to be felt The Nature of Chaos
If we imagine the international system as chaotic and not anarchic, we must also admit that this will have significant implications for our analysis and base assumptions. Indeed, as has been seen in meteorology, a revised understanding of the system mean that all assumptions based on the nature of the previously assumed system will need to be reviewed and, perhaps, overhauled. 39 It is the purpose of this section to identify some of the expectations and implications of assuming a chaotic system, particularly those that differ from those arising from the 'normal' anarchic system. Though the differences are many, there are three that will be highlighted here: the complex, time sensitive dependence of the system, and the importance of seemingly minor permutations within the system and the impossibility of long-term prediction. 40 Dealing with each in turn, it will be shown that a chaotic international relations system is not only conceptually and intellectually different to the system as it is imagined today, but also fundamentally and essentially different with regards to what is expected of an anarchic one. The first of the differences to be highlighted concerns the notion of complex time-sensitivity to events occurring within the system. In a chaotic system the precise time and nature of events makes a significant difference to the result within the wider system. For example, a difference of only a few thousandths of a degree in a temperature reading can have significant impacts on the behaviour of a wether system some weeks or months in the future. 41 Thought the system is deterministic -that is, it follows simple rules -it is so sensitive to changes in conditions that prediction becomes almost impossible. To take an example at a less abstract level, consider a typical ten day forecast by a television weather service. While it would be normal to consider the first and second days forecasts as likely to be nearly correct, few people would place great trust in the predictions for the ninth or tenth days. 42 The reason why the trust is misplaced is because of human experience with weather forecasts, but the reason the forecasts are wrong is because of the small permutations that impact upon the ability of the forecaster to predict the system under study.
Edward Lorenz identified this systemic quality in conducting experiments on
a very basic modelling system in which three simple non-linear equations formed the boundaries of 'climate'. Despite entering figures within one one-thousandth of being exactly correct, Lorenz found that the climate models he produced varied extensively over the longer term. 43 Such variation is typical of chaotic systems and -if the international system is imagined to be chaotic -then we should expect similar sensitivity to small elements within the system to have increasing effect on the wider system over time. It must be noted, however, that not every butterfly creates a distant storm every time it moves from flower to flower. 49 Should this be the case then there would be no stability at all within the climatic system and even short-term predictions -for example, the likelihood of rain tomorrow -would become impossible. Thus, it should be noted, that just as these small events can impact on the wider system in significant ways, they could also not impact on the system in significant ways. There is no compulsion implied, only possibility which, in turn, ensures that the chaotic system is sometimes driven by these tiny events and, at other times, does not react at all, despite being faced with perhaps millions of such small interactions at a time.
Finally, in a chaotic system we would expect that long-term prediction is not only unlikely but also truly impossible. Again returning to the example of the chaotic climate system, it is clear that short-term prediction is possible. After all, most meteorologists can predict with reasonable accuracy the weather for the following day and, in reality, many laypersons can do the same. 50 In the medium term, prediction is less likely to be correct, though it would still be most likely correct to claim that there will be a significant difference in temperature between January and August even if the exact difference is unknown. In the long-term, however, it is impossible to predict the chaotic climate outside of such general rearms as 'summer will be warmer than winter' or 'there will be more snow in Switzerland than the Sahara'. 51 The multiplication effect of billions of unit and system levels events leads to a situation where the future is unpredictable in all but 47 Excluding the work of lepidopterists, that is. 48 As Henri Poincare points out, "Small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena." in Marissa P. Justan. 2001 . The Butterfly Effect = Chaos Theory. Speech delivered to the Philippine Society of Youth Science Clubs, Cebu City, The Philippines, 4 th April 2001. 49 In a similar vein, Freud noted: "Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar". In chaos, sometimes a seemingly small and insignificant event is exactly that: small and insignificant. 50 There is indeed some meteorological truth to the folk saying, "Red sky at night, shepherds delight. Red sky in the morning, shepherd's warning". 51 A parallel prediction in the international relations system might be something like 'North America will still be further north than South America'. Of course, this is (very) likely to be true but it is not necessarily very useful information.
the most general terms -something useless to, say, a fisherman wanting to know whether some weekend will be rainy in some future time and place.
A chaotic international system would exhibit similar traits. Long-term prediction would prove impossible outside of general terms. While short-term prediction and even medium-term prediction would remain of some utility (for example, 'next week the US will still be the world's leading power') long-term prediction will be impossible and such predictions are just as likely to be wrong as right (for example, 'the US will be the world's leading power in 2100'). Perhaps some correlations can be drawn between the predictions of pundits at the dawn of the 20 th century -who imagined that the Concert of European powers would reign in peace and authority for years to come and the situation at the close of that same century: Russia collapsed, Germany peaceful, Japan demilitarised, the US in power, China rising, the UK and France with mere memories of domination and AustriaHungary ceasing to exist as an entity at all.
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It would seem, then, that there is at least a case to be made for the international system being a chaotic one rather than an anarchic one. With the implications of chaos including the three mentioned above, it is clear that the analysis, explanation and prediction of international affairs by international relations scholars must also evolve with this changing concept of the system. Thus, let us turn to an example from within Central and Eastern Europe from the last century in order to demonstrate the difference between anarchic and chaotic interpretations of the international system. This paper turns, then, to the debate on the reasons for the outbreak of World War One. 
The Origins of World
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While the scale of the conflict had never been seen before (and, in some ways, has not been seen since), it would seem that international relations analysts have taken it upon themselves to also consider only the grand interactions that, in an anarchic realm, are the only ones that are held to matter anyway. 58 Thus, it is clear that the standard explanation for the beginning of the First World War is mainly concerned with Great Power Politics, entangling alliances and a feeling of inevitability. In an anarchic system, where conflict is expected to be inevitable, this is to be expected. 59 But imagining a system that is chaotic instead allows the analyst to draw different conclusions, even to suggest that the war might not have been inevitable after all.
The First World War in a Chaotic System
What would of the war but he does not attribute cause to them as one might in an a chaotic system. See Bruce M. Russett. 1962. 'Cause, Surprise, and No Escape.' The Journal of Politics 24(1): 3-22, pp.7-9. 59 Waltz. 1979; Mearsheimer. 1990. 60 Michael Duffy. 2001 . Who's Who: Archduke Franz Ferdinand, viewed 14 th April 2006 Indeed, such questions haunt security scholars. Consider this from an editorial in International Security: "Though distant in time, the disaster of 1914 continues to haunt the contemporary security debate. In the nuclear age, the images that remain from the summer of 1914 -the escalation from an isolated event in a far corner of Europe to global war, the apparent loss of control of the situation by key decision-In a chaotic system, such seemingly insignificant events are exactly what determine the outcomes, even ones as devastating as the Great War. But consider not only this single event but also all of the others that were involved in putting the Archduke in Bosnia that day. Firstly, had his closer-to-the-throne relative not died, it would have been unlikely that the Ferdinand would have even been sent to Bosnia to review the troop exercises. Indeed, when he was born it seemed that there seemed little chance that Franz would ever be close to being heir to the throne, let alone be groomed for the crown, as he was when he died. Secondly, had his political views not been so widely misinterpreted outside of his own empire, it would seem that he would be an unlikely target for the Black Hand group.
Thirdly, had he not chosen to visit Sarajevo on the feast of St Vitus -a day on which the local Serbians traditionally take part in patriotic observances -the Archduke might not have been targeted at all.
62 Fourthly, as the Archduke's wife, Sophie, was not accorded the respect in Austria-Hungary a woman in her position would normally expect (owing to her parentage and 'station' in life wt the time they were married) then Ferdinand would not have had to leave Austria-Hungary in order to fete her in public for their anniversary. Whereas at home it would not be normal for the heir to parade with his wife in public, in Bosnia, far from home, it was completely acceptable. Thus, to celebrate their anniversary, the couple set to the streets of Sarajevo together, an action that might not have occurred had the Archduke been able to parade his wife in Vienna.
Thus, we see that some distinctly sub-system events conspired and interacted to place the Archduke in the firing line of Gavrilo Princip, the assassin who finally took the lives of the couple. A few small changes in the historical, cultural or social realities of the time would have seen either a completely different series of events lead up to the war or, perhaps and more interestingly, the war not makers, the crowding out of diplomacy by military exigencies, the awful, protracted, often senseless slaughter on the battlefield -raise troubling doubts about our ability to forever conduct affairs of state safely in an international environment plagued by the ever-present risk of thermonuclear war" (bold added). Such escalation, or feedback, and the 'apparent' loss of control can be interpreted as signposts of a chaotic system. what-ifs and but-ifs that, in interacting, define the system. The little things in a system do matter and actors should sweat the small stuff. Unlike an anarchic system where nobody is in control, everyone in a chaotic system is in control and every interaction can affect every other.
Conclusion: The Utility of the Chaotic System Metaphor
Imagining the pre-World War I system as chaotic not only allows the analyst to see the impact that small events have on a wider system, it also instructs us in the failures of those who attempted to analyse the happenings of the time. With a concentration on events at the national or international level, few analysts or foreign policy advisors would have had cause to warn the Archduke not to travel to a region that, officially and legally, was part of his domain. With a concentration on the alliances of the continent, people of the time ignored local uprisings and terrorist groups -perhaps in much the same way that, during the Cold War, the great powers ignored an emerging terrorist problem of their own. In a chaotic system the analyst is forced to look beyond the great problems and powers else he or she is likely to miss the 'little things' that eventually shape the world and, in this case study, the greatest conflict humankind had known to that point in global history.
The origin of World War One remains one of the most contested questions in international political and military history. Some continue to point to the inevitability of the conflict, resorting to theoretical support from realists and neorealists who maintain that, under anarchy, war is likely and often just a matter of poor balancing by states. But a focus on the large matters in international relations has not helped to explain the modern international system, nor predict major events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or the falling of the Berlin Wall. Unit or individual level analysis would have helped to predict and explain these events, but only when the individual level interactions are considered important enough to affect the entire system. Thus, the same seemingly insignificant matters -a small group of terrorists in a Soviet occupied Afghanistan, for example -arise time and again. And, time and again, we are surprised that such small matters can have such a significant impact on the entire system. As Richard Lebow argues, "what made Europe ripe for war was not the multitude of its alleged causes but the pattern of interaction between them" -assuming a chaotic system allows the analyst to focus on the effects of such interactions, an option not open to those who base their analysis on an anarchic model.
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It is the argument of this paper that this is unlikely to change while international relations persists with the notion that the international system is anarchic when, it would seem, there is at least a chance that it may be something else. The example of the beginning of World War One is simply a pertinent case study where a series of small matters -the date of arrival in a hostile Serbian area and the woman the heir to the throne fell in love with, for example -combine to brig about an event so massive that it became known as 'The War to End All Wars'.
Without a new paradigm, international relations will continue to misdiagnose the past, hampering its ability to explain the present and, one day, predict the storms which sweep the system as we know it today.
